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Abstract
We develop a semantics for logics of imperfect information with respect
to general models.
Then we build a proof system and prove its soundness and complete-
ness with respect to this semantics.
1 Introduction
Logics of imperfect information are extensions of first-order logic (or, sometimes,
of other logics: see for example Tulenheimo [13] and Va¨a¨na¨nen [15]) which allow
to reason about patterns of dependence and independence between variables.
Historically, the earliest such logic was branching quantifier logic (Henkin
[5]), which adds to the language of first order logic branching quantifiers such
as (
∀x ∃y
∀z ∃w
)
φ(x, y, z, w)
whose interpretation, informally speaking, states that the choice of y is not
dependent on the choice of z and the choice of w is not dependent on the choice
of x. A significant breakthrough in the study of this class of logics occurred
with the development of independence-friendly logic (Hintikka and Sandu [7]),
through which
1. The syntax of branching quantifier logic was significantly simplified, do-
ing away with complex structures of quantifiers such as the above one and
introducing instead slashed quantifiers (∃x/W )φ, whose informal interpre-
tation is “there exists a x, not dependent on any variables inW , such that
φ”;
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2. The game-theoretic semantics of logics of imperfect information was de-
fined formally, and its properties were examined in detail.
These developments made it possible to define, in [8], a compositional semantics
for independence-friendly logic which is equivalent to its game-theoretic seman-
tics. This semantics, called team semantics or trump semantics, differs from
Tarski’s semantics for first order logic in that satisfaction conditions of formulas
are predicated not of single assignments, but of sets of assignments1 (which we
will henceforth call Teams, after the terminology of Va¨a¨na¨nen [14]).
This alternate semantics provided one of the main impulses towards the de-
velopment of dependence logic [14], which separates the notion of dependence
and independence from the notion of quantification by doing away with slashed
quantifier and introducing instead dependence atoms of the form =(t1 . . . tn),
where t1 . . . tn are terms, which are satisfied by a team X if and only if the
value of tn is a function of the values of t1 . . . tn−1 in it. This - only at first sight
minor - innovation led to a number of significant advances in the study of the
properties of logics of imperfect information, and, in particular, of their model
theory; apart from the aforementioned [14], we can refer here for example to
the results of (Juha) Kontinen and Va¨a¨na¨nen [10] and (Jarmo) Kontinen [9].
Furthermore, a recent direction of research in the field of logics of imperfect
information consists in the study of the model-theoretical properties of variants
of dependence logic obtained by substituting the dependence atoms with other
kinds of non first-order atomic formulas. The earliest work along these lines
was Gra¨del and Va¨a¨na¨nen [4], whose independence logic is expressively stronger
than dependence logic and will be the main logical formalism taken in exam in
the rest of this work; furthermore, we have multivalued dependence logic from
Engstro¨m [2] and inclusion logic and exclusion logic from Galliani [3].2
One property common to all these papers is that they are essentially con-
cerned only with the semantics of logics of imperfect information and its model-
theoretic properties. The corresponding proof theories, instead, are still rela-
tively undeveloped. The recent [11] presents a sound and complete deduction
system for extracting the first-order consequences of a Dependence Logic the-
ory; however, due to the equivalence between Dependence Logic and existential
second-order logic there exists no hope of extending this system to one for
deducing the Dependence Logic consequences of a Dependence Logic theory ac-
cording to the standard semantics. The present paper, drawing inspiration from
Henkin’s treatment of second order logic [6] and from the analysis of branching
quantifiers of [12], may be seen as a different approach to the study of the proof
1Later, Cameron and Hodges [1] proved, through combinatorial methods, that no compo-
sitional semantics for such a logic exists in which the satisfaction conditions are predicated of
single assignments.
2That paper also characterized precisely the expressive power of independence logic with
respect to open formulas, thus answering an open problem of [4], and proved that inclusion
and exclusion logic are strictly weaker than independence logic.
2
theories of logics of imperfect information: instead of restricting our language,
we will weaken the semantics and consider a more general class of models and
then we will develop a proof system capable of extracting all valid formula for
this new semantics.
2 Independence Logic
In this section, we will briefly recall the syntax and the semantics of Indepen-
dence Logic, plus a few of its basic properties. It can be safely skipped by
anyone who is already familiar with the results of [4].
As is often done in the field of logics of imperfect information, we will assume
that our expressions are always in Negation Normal Form.
Definition 2.1 (Syntax) Let Σ be a first order signature. Then the set NNFΣ
of the negation normal form formulas of our logic is the smallest set such that
NNF-lit If φ is a first order literal over the signature Σ then φ ∈ NNFΣ;
NNF-ind If ~t1, ~t2 and ~t3 are tuples of terms with signature Σ then ~t2 ⊥~t1
~t3
is in NNFΣ;
NNF-∨ If φ and ψ are in NNFΣ then φ ∨ ψ is also in NNFΣ;
NNF-∧ If φ and ψ are in NNFΣ then φ ∧ ψ is also in NNFΣ;
NNF-∃ If φ is in NNFΣ and x is a variable then ∃xφ is in NNFΣ;
NNF-∀ If φ is in NNFΣ and x is a variable then ∀xφ is in NNFΣ.
The set Free(φ) of the free variables of a formula φ is defined similarly to the
case of First Order Logic:
Definition 2.2 (Free Variables) Let Σ be a first order signature, and let φ ∈
NNFΣ. Then the set Free(φ) of the free variables of φ is defined by structural
induction on φ as follows:
Free-lit If φ is a first order literal then Free(φ) is the set of all variables oc-
curring in φ;
Free-ind If φ is ~t2 ⊥~t1
~t3 then Free(φ) is the set of all variables occurring in
~t1, ~t2 or ~t3;
Free-∨ If φ is ψ ∨ θ for some formulas ψ, θ ∈ NNFΣ then Free(φ) is Free(ψ) ∪
Free(θ);
Free-∧ If φ is ψ ∧ θ for some formulas ψ, θ ∈ NNFΣ then Free(φ) is Free(ψ) ∪
Free(θ);
Free-∃ If φ is ∃xψ for some variable x and some ψ ∈ NNFΣ then Free(φ) =
Free(ψ)\{x};
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Free-∀ If φ is ∀xψ for some variable x and some ψ ∈ NNFΣ then Free(φ) =
Free(ψ)\{x}.
The following definition is standard:
Definition 2.3 (Team) Let V be a finite set of variables and let M be a first
order model. A team over M with domain V is a set of first order assignments
over M with domain V .
The next definition will be useful to give the semantics for the “lax” (in the
sense of [3]) version of the existential quantifier that we will use:
Definition 2.4 (x-variation) Let M be a first order model, let X be a team
over M , and let x be a variable symbol (not necessarily in Dom(X)). Then
a team X ′ of M with domain Dom(X ′) = Dom(X) ∪ {x} is said to be a x-
variation of X, and we write X [x]X ′, if and only if the restrictions of X and
X ′ to Dom(X)\{x} are the same.
At this point, we have all that we need in order to define the team semantics
for independence logic.
Definition 2.5 (Team Semantics for Independence Logic) Let Σ be a first
order signature, let M be a first order model of signature Σ, let φ ∈ NNFΣ and
let X be a team with domain containing Free(φ). Then we say that X satisfies
φ in M , and we write M |=X φ, if and only if
TS-lit φ is a first order literal and, for all s ∈ X, M |=s φ in the usual first
order sense;
TS-ind φ is ~t2 ⊥~t1
~t3 for some tuples of terms ~t1, ~t2 and ~t3, and for all s, s
′ ∈ X
with ~t1〈s〉 = ~t1〈s′〉 there exists a s′′ ∈ X with ~t1~t2〈s′′〉 = ~t1~t2〈s〉 and
~t1~t3〈s′′〉 = ~t1~t3〈s′〉;
TS-∨ φ is ψ1 ∨ ψ2 for two formulas ψ1, ψ2 ∈ NNFΣ and X = Y ∪ Z for some
two teams Y and Z such that M |=Y ψ1 and M |=Z ψ2;
TS-∧ φ is ψ1∧ψ2 for two formulas ψ1, ψ2 ∈ NNFΣ, M |=X ψ1 and M |=X ψ2;
TS-∃ φ is ∃xψ for some variable x and some ψ ∈ NNFΣ and there exists a
team X ′ such that X [x]X ′ (that is, X ′ is a x-variation of X) and such
that M |=X′ ψ;
TS-∀ φ is ∀xψ for some suitable x and M |=X[M/x] ψ, where
X [M/x] = {s[m/x] : s ∈ X,m ∈ Dom(M)}.
As [4] shows, the dependence atom =(t1 . . . tn) is equivalent to the independence
atom tn ⊥t1...tn−1 tn. Therefore, Dependence Logic is contained in Independence
Logic. The following result is also in [4]:
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Theorem 2.6 ([4]) Let Σ be a first order signature, let V = {~v} be a finite
set of variables and let φ(~v) ∈ NNFΣ be an Independence Logic formula with
signature Σ and free variables in V . Then there exists an existential second
order logic formula Φ(R) such that, for all models M with signature Σ and all
teams X over M with domain V ,
M |=X φ⇔M |= Φ(Rel(X))
where Rel(X) = {s(~v) : s ∈ X}.
In [3], the converse of this result is proved:
Theorem 2.7 ([3]) Let Σ be a first order signature, let V = {~v} be a finite set
of variables and let Φ(R) be an existential second order formula with signature
Σ and with R as its only free variable, where R is a relational variable of arity
|~v|. Then there exists an independence logic formula φ(~v), over the signature Σ
and with free variables in ~v, such that
M |=X φ⇔M |= Φ(Rel(X))
for all models M with signature Σ and all nonempty teams X over M with
domain V .
3 General models for independence logic
In this section, we will develop a generalization of team semantics, along the
lines of Henkin’s treatment of second order logic. As we will see, the fact that
Independence Logic corresponds to Existential Second Order Logic (and not to
full Second Order Logic) means that we will be able to restrict ourselves to
consider only a very specific kind of general model.
Definition 3.1 (General Model) Let Σ be a first order signature. A general
model with signature Σ is a pair (M,G), where M is a first order model with
signature Σ and G is a set of teams over finite domains, respecting the condition
• If φ(x1 . . . xn, ~m, ~R) is a first order formula, where ~m is a tuple of constant
parameters in Dom(M) and where ~R is a tuple of “relation parameters”
corresponding to teams in G, in the sense that each Ri is of the form
Ri = Rel(X) = {s(~z) : s ∈ Xi}
for some Xi ∈ G, then for
‖φ(x1 . . . xn, ~m, ~R)‖M = {s : Dom(s) = {x1 . . . xn},M |=s φ(x1 . . . xn, ~m, ~R)}
it holds that ‖φ(x1 . . . xn, ~m, ~R)‖M ∈ G.
5
Lemma 3.2 Let Σ be a first order signature and let (M,G) be a general model
with signature Σ. Then for all X ∈ G and all variables y, X [M/y] ∈ G.
Proof:
Let Dom(X) = {~x}, let R = Rel(X), and consider the formula φ(~x, y) =
∃yR(~x). Then take any assignment s with domain {~x, y}: by construction,
M |=s φ(~x, y)⇔ ∃m s.t. s[m/y]|~x ∈ X ⇔ s ∈ X [M/y], as required.
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
We can easily adapt the team semantics of the previous section to general
models. We report all the rules here, for ease of reference; but the only differ-
ences between this semantics and the previous one are in the cases PTS-∨ and
PTS-∃.
Definition 3.3 (General Team Semantics for Independence Logic) Let
Σ be a first order signature, let (M,G) be a general model of signature Σ, let
φ ∈ NNFΣ be a formula of Independence Logic and let X ∈ G be a team with
domain containing Free(φ). Then we say that X satisfies φ in (M,G), and we
write (M,G) |=X φ, if and only if
GTS-lit φ is a first order literal and, for all s ∈ X, M |=s φ in the usual first
order sense;
GTS-ind φ is ~t2 ⊥~t1
~t3 for some tuples of terms ~t1, ~t2 and ~t3, and for all
s, s′ ∈ X with ~t1〈s〉 = ~t1〈s′〉 there exists a s′′ ∈ X with ~t1~t2〈s′′〉 = ~t1~t2〈s〉
and ~t1~t3〈s′′〉 = ~t1~t3〈s′〉;
GTS-∨ φ is ψ1 ∨ψ2 for two formulas ψ1, ψ2 ∈ NNFΣ and X = Y ∪Z for some
two teams Y, Z ∈ G such that (M,G) |=Y ψ1 and (M,G) |=Z ψ2;
GTS-∧ φ is ψ1 ∧ ψ2 for two formulas ψ1, ψ2 ∈ NNFΣ, (M,G) |=X ψ1 and
(M,G) |=X ψ2;
GTS-∃ φ is ∃xψ for some variable x and some ψ ∈ NNFΣ and there exists a
team X ′ ∈ G such that X [x]X ′ and such that (M,G) |=X′ ψ;
GTS-∀ φ is ∀xψ for some suitable x and (M,G) |=X[M/x] ψ.
The usual semantics for Independence Logic satisfies a locality principle: in brief,
the satisfiability of a formula φ in a team depends only on the restriction of the
team to Free(φ). Let us verify that the same holds for entailment semantics:
Lemma 3.4 Let (M,G) be a general model, and let X ∈ G be such that Dom(X) =
~x~y. Then X|~x = {s : Dom(s) = ~x, ∃~m s.t. s[~m/~y] ∈ X} is in G.
Furthermore, let Y ⊆ X|G be such that Y ∈ G. Then the team
X(~x ∈ Y ) = {s ∈ X : s|~x ∈ Y }
3Here by s[m/y]|~x we intend the restriction of s[m/y] to the domain {x1 . . . xn}. If y is
among x1 . . . xn, then this is the same of s[m/y] itself; otherwise, it is simply s.
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is in G.
Proof:
By definition, X|~x is ‖φ(~x,R)‖M , where φ is ∃~y(R~x~y) and R = Rel(X). There-
fore, X|~x ∈ G.
Similarly, X(~x ∈ Y ) is ‖φ(~x~y,R1, R2)‖M , where φ is R1~x~y ∧ R2~x, R1 is
Rel(X) and R2 is Rel(Y ).

Theorem 3.5 (Locality) Let (M,G) be a general model, let X ∈ G and let φ
be an independence logic formula over the signature of M with Free(φ) = ~z ⊆
Dom(X). Then (M,G) |=X φ if and only if (M,G) |=X|~z φ.
Proof:
The proof is by structural induction on φ. We present only the passages corre-
sponding to disjunction and existential quantification, as the others are trivial:
• Suppose that (M,G) |=X ψ1 ∨ ψ2. Then, by definition, there exist teams
Y and Z in G such that X = Y ∪ Z, (M,G) |=Y ψ1 and M |=Z ψ2. By
induction hypothesis, this means that (M,G) |=Y|~z ψ1 and (M,G) |=Z|~z ψ2.
But Y|~z ∪ Z|~z = X|~z, and hence (M,G) |=X|~z ψ1 ∨ ψ2.
Conversely, suppose that (M,G) |=X|~z ψ1 ∨ ψ2. Then there exist teams
Y ′, Z ′ in G such that (M,G) |=Y ′ ψ1, (M,G) |=Z′ ψ2 and X|~z = X
′ ∪ Y ′.
Now let Y be X(~z ∈ Y ′) and Z be X(~z ∈ Z ′); by construction, Y ∪Z = X ,
and furthermore Y ′ = Y|~z and Z
′ = Z|~z, and, by the lemma, Y and Z are
in G. Thus, by induction hypothesis, (M,G) |=Y ψ1 and (M,G) |=Z ψ2,
and finally (M,G) |=X ψ1 ∨ ψ2, as required.
• Suppose that (M,G) |=X ∃xψ. Then there exists a team Y ∈ G such
that X [x]Y and (M,G) |=Y ψ. By induction hypothesis, this means that
(M,G) |=Y|~zx ψ too; and since X|~z[x]Y|~zx, this implies that M |=X|~z ∃xψ,
as required.
Conversely, suppose that (M,G) |=X|~z ∃xψ. Then there exists a team
Y ′, with domain ~zx, such that M |=Y ′ ψ and X|~z[x]Y
′. Now let Y be
(X [M/x])(~zx ∈ Y ′). By the lemma, Y ∈ G; furthermore, Y|~zx = Y
′, and
hence by induction hypothesis (M,G) |=Y ψ. Finally, X [x]Y : indeed, if
s ∈ X then s~z[m/x] ∈ Y
′ for some m ∈ Dom(M), and hence s[m/x] ∈ Y
for the same m, and on the other hand, Y is contained in X [M/x], and
hence if s[m/x] ∈ Y it follows that s ∈ X .
Therefore (M,G) |=X ∃xψ, as required.

As in the case of Second Order Logic, first-order models can be represented
as a special kind of general model:
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Definition 3.6 (Full models) Let (M,G) be a general model. Then it is said
to be full if and only if G contains all teams over M .
The following result is then trivial.
Proposition 3.7 Let (M,G) be a full model. Then for all suitable teams X
and formulas φ, (M,G) |=X φ in general team semantics if and only if M |=X φ
in the usual team semantics.
Proof:
Follows at once by comparing the rules of Team Semantics and General Team
Semantics for the case that G contains all teams.

How does the satisfaction relation in general team semantics change if we
vary the set G? The following definition and result give us some information
about this:
Definition 3.8 (Refinement) Let (M,G) and (M,G′) be two general models.
Then we say that (M,G′) is a refinement of (M,G), and we write (M,G) ⊆
(M,G′), if and only if G ⊆ G′.
Intuitively speaking, a refinement of a general model is another general model
with more teams than it. The following result shows that refinements preserve
satisfaction relations:
Theorem 3.9 Let (M,G) and (M,G′) be two general models with
(M,G) ⊆ (M,G′), let X ∈ G, and let φ be a formula over the signature of M
with Free(φ) ⊆ Dom(X). Then
(M,G) |=X φ⇒ (M,G
′) |=X φ.
Proof:
The proof is an easy induction on φ.
1. If φ is a first order literal, the result is obvious, as the choice of the set of
teams G (or G′) does not enter into the definition of satisfaction condition
PTS-lit.
2. If φ is an independence atom, the result is also obvious, for the same
reason.
3. If (M,G) |=X ψ1 ∨ ψ2 then there exist two teams Y, Z ∈ G such that X =
Y ∪Z, (M,G) |=Y ψ1 and (M,G) |=Z ψ2. But Y and Z are also in G′, and
by induction hypothesis we have that (M,G′) |=Y ψ1 and (M,G′) |=Z ψ2,
and therefore (M,G′) |=X ψ1 ∨ ψ2.
4. If (M,G) |=X ψ1 ∧ ψ2 then (M,G) |=X ψ1 and (M,G) |=X ψ2. Then,
by induction hypothesis, (M,G′) |=X ψ1 and (M,G
′) |=X ψ2, and finally
(M,G′) |=X ψ1 ∧ ψ2.
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5. If (M,G) |=X ∃xψ then there exists a X ′ ∈ G such that X [x]X ′ and
(M,G) |=X′ ψ. But then X ′ is also in G′, and by induction hypothesis
(M,G′) |=X′ ψ, and finally (M,G′) |=X ∃xψ.
6. If (M,G) |=X ∀xψ then (M,G) |=X[M/x] ψ. Then, by induction hypothe-
sis, (M,G′) |=X[M/x] ψ, and finally (M,G
′) |=X ∀xψ.

This result shows us that, as was to be expected from the equivalence between
independence logic and existential second order logic, if we are interested in
formulas which hold in all general models over a certain first-order model we only
need to pay attention to the smallest (in the sense of the refinement relation)
ones. But do such “least general models” exist? As the following result shows,
this is indeed the case:
Proposition 3.10 Let {(M,Gi) : i ∈ I} be a family of general models with
signature Σ and over the same first order model M . Then (M,
⋂
i∈I Gi) is also
a general model.
Proof:
Let φ(x1 . . . xn, ~m, ~R) be a first order formula with parameters, where each Ri
is of the form Rel(X) for some X ∈ ∩iGi. Then the team ‖φ(x1 . . . xn, ~m, ~R)‖M
is in Gi for all i ∈ I, and therefore it is in
⋂
i∈I G, as required.

Therefore, it is indeed possible to talk about the least general model over a
first order model.
Definition 3.11 (Least General Model) LetM be a first order model. Then
the least general model over M is the (M,L), where
L =
⋂
{G : (M,G) is a general model.}
What is the purpose of least general models? The answer comes as a consequence
of Theorem 3.9, and can be summarized by the following corollary:
Corollary 3.12 Let Σ be a first order signature, let M be a first order model
over it and let (M,L) be the least general model over it. Then, for all teams
X ∈ L and all formulas φ with signature Σ and with free variables in Dom(X),
(M,L) |=X φ⇔ (M,G) |=X φ for all general models (M,G) over M.
Proof:
Suppose that (M,L) |=X φ. Then take any general model (M,G): by defini-
tion, we have that (M,L) ⊆ (M,G), and hence by Theorem 3.9 we have that
(M,G) |=X φ.
Conversely, suppose that (M,G) |=X φ for all general models (M,G); then
in particular (M,L) |=X φ, as required.
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We can also find a more practical characterization of this “least general
model”.
Proposition 3.13 Let M be a first order model. Then the least general model
over it is (M,L), where L is the set of all ‖φ(~x, ~m)‖M , where φ ranges over all
first order formulas and ~m ranges over all tuples of variables of suitable length.
Proof:
If (M,G) is a general model then L ⊆ G by definition; therefore, we only need
to prove that (M,L) is a general model.
Now, let φ(~x, ~m, ~R) be a first order formula, and let each Ri be Rel(Xi)
for some Xi ∈ L. So for each Ri, any assignment s and any suitable tuple of
terms t, M |=s Ri~t if and only if M |=s ψi(~t, ~ni) for some first order formula ψi
with parameters ~ni. Now let φ
′(~x, ~m,~n1, ~n2, . . .) be the expression obtained by
substituting, in φ, each instance of Ri~t with ψi(~t, ~ni); by construction, we have
that M |=s φ(~x, ~m, ~R) if and only if M |=s φ′(~x, ~m,~n1, . . .), and therefore
‖φ(~x, ~m, ~R)‖M = ‖φ
′(~x, ~m,~n1, ~n2, . . .)‖M ∈ L
as required.

As long as we are only considering teams in L, studying satisfiability with
respect to the least model (M,L) is the same as considering satisfiability with
respect to all general models over M . This restriction may at first sight seem
a bit unpractical, but it becomes irrelevant when it comes to the problem of
validity:
Definition 3.14 (Validity wrt general models) Let Σ be a first order sig-
nature, let V be a finite set of variables, and let φ ∈ NNFΣ be a formula of
our language with free variables in V . Then φ is valid with respect to general
models if and only if (M,G) |=X φ for all general models (M,G) with signature
Σ and for all teams X ∈ G with Dom(X) ⊇ Free(φ). If this is the case, we write
GTS |= φ.
Definition 3.15 (Validity wrt least general models) Let Σ be a first or-
der signature, let V be a finite set of variables, and let φ ∈ NNFΣ be a formula
of our language with free variables in V . Then φ is valid with respect to least
general models if and only if (M,L) |=X φ for all least general models (M,L)
with signature Σ and for all teams X ∈ L with Dom(X) ⊇ Free(φ). If this is
the case, we write LTS |= φ.
Lemma 3.16 Let M be a first order model with signature Σ, and let M ′ be
another first order model with signature Σ′ ⊇ Σ such that the restriction of M ′
to Σ is precisely M . Then for all general models G for M ′, for all formulas φ
with signature Σ and for all X ∈ G,
(M,G) |=X φ⇔ (M
′,G) |=X φ.
10
Proof:
First of all, if (M ′,G) is a general model then (M,G) is also a general model.
Then, the result is proved by observing that the truth conditions of our seman-
tics depend only on the interpretations of the symbols in the signature of the
formula (and on the choice of G, of course).

Lemma 3.17 Let (M,G) be a general model with signature Σ, let S 6∈ Σ be a
new relation symbol and let X ∈ G. Furthermore, let M ′ =M [Rel(X)/S] be the
extension of M to the signature Σ∪{S} such that SM
′
= Rel(X). Then (M ′,G)
is a general model.
Proof:
Let φ(~x, ~m, ~R) be a first order formula with signature Σ ∪ {S} and parameters
~m and ~R, where each Ri is Rel(Xi) for some Xi ∈ G. Then let φ′(~x, ~m, ~R, S) be
the first order formula with signature Σ, where S now stands for the relation
Rel(X). Now clearly
‖φ(~x, ~m, ~R)‖M ′ = ‖φ
′(~x, ~m, ~R, S)‖M ∈ G,
as required.

Theorem 3.18 A formula φ is valid wrt general models if and only if it is valid
wrt least general models.
Proof:
The left to right direction is obvious. For the right to left direction, suppose
that LTS |= φ, let (M,G) be a general model whose signature contains the
signature of φ, and let X ∈ G be a team whose domain {x1 . . . xn} contains all
free variables of φ. Then consider the first order model M ′ = M [Rel(X)/S],
where S is a new relation symbol, and take the least general model (M ′,L) over
it. We clearly have that X ∈ L, since
X = {s : Dom(s) = {x1 . . . xn},M
′ |=s Sx1 . . . xn}
and, therefore, (M ′,L) |=X φ by hypothesis. Now, by Lemma 3.17, (M ′,G)
is a general model, and therefore by definition L ⊆ G, and hence by Theorem
3.9 (M ′,G) |=X φ too. Finally, the relation symbol S does not occur in φ, and
therefore by Lemma 3.16 (M,G) |=X φ, as required.

In the next section, we will develop another, more syntactic way of reasoning
about least general models.
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4 Entailment semantics
Let (M,L) be a least general model; then, as we saw, L is the set of all teams
corresponding to first order formulas with parameters. Therefore, in order to
reason about satisfaction in a least general team, there is no need to carry around
sets of assignments; rather, we can use these first order formulas themselves as
our context-carrying objects. In this section, we will develop this idea, building
up a new “entailment semantics” and proving its equivalence with “least general
model semantics”.
In order to do all of this, we first need to be a bit more formal about the
concept of “constant parameters”. This is achieved through the following defi-
nitions:
Definition 4.1 (Parameter and Team Variables) LetVP = {p1 . . . pn, . . .}
be a fixed, countably infinite set of variables. We will call them parameter vari-
ables. The variables VT = {x, y, z, . . .} = V\VP will be called team variables.
Definition 4.2 (Free Parameter and Team Variables) Let φ be any for-
mula. Then FreeP (φ) = Free(φ) ∩VP and FreeT (φ) = Free(φ) ∩VT .
Parameter variables clarify the interpretation of such expressions such asM |=s
γ(~x, ~m): this is simply a shorthand M |=h∪s γ(~x, ~p), where h is a parameter
assignment with domain ~p and with h(~p) = ~m. Team variables, instead, are
going to be used in order to describe the variables in the domain of the team
corresponding to a given first order expression: for any first order γ(~x, ~p), where
~x are team variables and ~p are parameter variables, and for any h with do-
main ~p, we will therefore have ‖γ(~x, ~p)‖M,h = ‖γ(~x, h(~p))‖M = {s : Dom(s) =
~x,M |=h∪s γ}. For this reason, parameter variables will never occur in the
domain of a team, and, hence, from this point on we will always assume that
parameter variables never occur in independence logic formulas, but only in the
first order team definitions.
After these preliminaries, we can now give our main definition for this sec-
tion:
Definition 4.3 (Entailment Semantics for Independence Logic) Let M
be a first order model with signature Σ, let γ(~x, ~p) be a first order formula for the
same signature with FreeT = ~x and FreeP = ~p, let h be a parameter assignment
with domain ~p and let φ ∈ NNFΣ be an Independence Logic formula.
Then we say that γ satisfies φ in M under h, and we write M |=γ(h) φ, if
and only if
ES-lit φ is a first order literal and for all assignments s with domain FreeT (γ)∪
FreeT (φ) such that M |=h∪s γ it holds that M |=s φ;
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ES-ind φ is ~t2 ⊥~t1
~t3 for some tuples of terms ~t1, ~t2 and ~t3 and for all assign-
ments s and s′ with domain FreeT (γ)∪FreeT (~t1~t2~t3) such that M |=h∪s γ,
M |=h∪s′ γ and ~t1〈s〉 = ~t1〈s′〉 there exists a s′′ such that M |=h∪s′′ γ,
~t1~t2〈s′′〉 = ~t1~t2〈s〉 and ~t1~t3〈s′′〉 = ~t1~t3〈s′〉;
ES-∨ φ is ψ1∨ψ2 and there exists a parameter assignment h′ extending4 h and
two first order formulas γ1 and γ2 such that
• FreeP (γ1),FreeP (γ2) ⊆ Dom(h′);
• M |=γ1(h′) ψ1;
• M |=γ2(h′) ψ2;
• M |=h′ ∀~v(γ ↔ γ1∨γ2), where ~v is FreeT (γ)∪FreeT (γ1)∪FreeT (γ2);
ES-∧ φ is ψ1 ∧ ψ2, M |=γ(h) ψ1 and M |=γ(h) ψ2;
ES-∃ φ is ∃xnψ and there exist a parameter assignment h′ extending h and a
first order formula γ′ with FreeP (γ
′) ⊆ Dom(h′) such that
• M |=γ′(h′) ψ;
• M |=h′ ∀~v(∃xnγ′ ↔ ∃xnγ), where ~v is FreeT (γ) ∪ FreeT (γ′);
ES-∀ φ is ∀xnψ and there exists a parameter assignment h′ extending h and a
first order formula γ′ with FreeP (γ
′) ⊆ Dom(h′) such that
• M |=γ′(h′) ψ;
• M |=h′ ∀~v(γ′ ↔ ∃xnγ), where ~v is FreeT (γ) ∪ FreeT (γ′).
Proposition 4.4 Let M be a first order model with signature Σ, let γ(~x, ~p) be a
first order formula with FreeP (γ) = ~p and let h, h
′ be two parameter assignments
with domains containing ~p such that h(~p) = h′(~p). Then, for all independence
logic formulas φ,
M |=γ(h) φ⇔M |=γ(h′) φ.
Proof:
The proof is a straightforward induction over φ.

As the next result shows, entailment semantics is entirely equivalent to least
general model semantics:
Theorem 4.5 Let Σ be a first order model, let γ(~x, ~p) be a first order formula
with FreeP (γ) = ~p, let h be a parameter assignment with domain ~p and let
φ ∈ NNFΣ be an independence logic formula with free variables in ~x.
Furthermore, let (M,L) be the least general model over M , and let X =
‖γ(~x, ~p)‖M,h = {s : Dom(s) = {~x},M |=h∪s γ(~x, ~m)}. Then
(M,L) |=X φ⇔M |=γ(h) φ.
4That is, Dom(h′) ⊇ Dom(h), and h′(~p) = h(~p).
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Proof:
The proof is by structural induction on φ, and presents no difficulties.
1. If φ is a first order literal, (M,L) |=X φ if and only if, for all s ∈ X , it
holds that M |=s φ. But s ∈ X if and only if M |=s γ(~x, h(~p)), and hence
(M,L) |=X φ if and only if M |=γ φ, as required.
2. If φ is an independence atom, the result is also obvious, and follows at
once from a comparison of the rules PTS-ind and ES-ind.
3. If φ is ψ1 ∨ ψ2,
(M,L) |=X ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ⇔
⇔ ∃Y, Z ∈ L s.t. X = Y ∪ Z, (M,L) |=Y ψ1 and (M,L) |=Z ψ2 ⇔
⇔ ∃h′ = h[~m/~q] extending h and ∃γ1γ2 s.t., for Y = ‖γ1(~x, ~p~q)‖M,h′ ,
Z = ‖γ2(~x, ~p~q)‖M,h′ , X = ‖γ(~x, ~p)‖M,h = ‖γ(~x, ~p)‖M,h′ = Y ∪ Z,
(M,L) |=Y ψ1 and (M,L) |=Z ψ2 ⇔
⇔ ∃h′ = h[~m/~q] extending h and ∃γ1γ2 s.t. M |=h′ ∀~v(γ ↔ γ1 ∨ γ2),
M |=γ1(h′) ψ and M |=γ2(h′) θ ⇔
⇔M |=γ(h) ψ ∨ θ.
4. If φ is ψ ∧ θ,
(M,L) |=X ψ ∧ θ ⇔ (M,L) |=X ψ and (M,L) |=X θ ⇔
⇔M |=γ(h) ψ and M |=γ(h) θ ⇔M |=γ(h) ψ ∧ θ.
5. If φ is ∃xnψ,
(M,L) |=X ∃xnψ ⇔ ∃X
′ ∈ L s.t. X [xn]X
′ and (M,L) |=X′ ψ ⇔
⇔ ∃h′ = h[~m/~q] extending h and ∃γ′ s.t., for X ′ = ‖γ′(~x, ~p~q)‖M,h′ ,
X [xn]X
′ and (M,L) |=X′ ψ ⇔
⇔ ∃h′ = h[~m/~q] extending h and ∃γ′ s.t. M |=h′ ∀~v(∃xnγ ↔ ∃xnγ
′) and
and M |=γ′(h′) ψ ⇔
⇔M |=γ(h) ∃xnψ;
6. If φ is ∀xnψ,
(M,L) |=X ∀xnψ ⇔ ∃X
′ ∈ L s.t. X ′ = X [M/xn] and (M,L) |=X′ ψ ⇔
⇔ ∃h′ = h[~m/~q] extending h and ∃γ′ s.t., for X ′ = ‖γ′(~x, ~pq)‖M,h′ ,
X ′ = X [M/xn] and (M,L) |=X′ ψ ⇔
⇔ ∃h′ = h[~m/~q] extending h and ∃γ′ s.t. M |=h′ ∀~v(γ
′ ↔ ∃xnγ) and
and M |=γ′(h′) ψ ⇔
⇔M |=γ(h) ∀xnψ.
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Definition 4.6 (Validity in Entailment Semantics) Let φ be an Indepen-
dence Logic formula. Then φ is valid in entailment semantics if and only if
M |=γ(h) φ for all first order models M with signature containing that of φ, for
all first order formulas γ(~x, ~p) over the signature of M and for all parameter
assignments h with domain ~p. If this is the case, we write ENS |= φ.
Corollary 4.7 For all formulas φ, ENS |= φ if and only if LTS |= φ if and
only if GTS |= φ
It will also be useful to have a slightly more general notion of validity in
entailment semantics:
Definition 4.8 (Validity wrt a Team Definition) Let γ(~x, ~p) be a first or-
der formula and let φ be an independence logic formula. Then φ is valid with
respect to γ if and only if M |=γ(h) φ for all first order models M with signature
containing those of γ and φ and for all parameter assignments h with domain
~p. If this is the case, we write |=γ φ.
Proposition 4.9 Let φ be an independence logic formula with FreeT (φ) = ~x,
and let R be a |~x|-ary relation symbol not occurring in γ. Then ENS |= φ if and
only if |=R~x φ.
Proof:
Suppose that ENS |= φ. Then in particular, for any model M whose signature
contains that of φ and R we have that M |=R~x φ, and hence |=R~x φ.
Conversely, suppose that |=R~x φ, let M be a first order model
5, and let
X ∈ L be any team with domain ~x. Let us then consider the modelM ′ obtained
by adding to M the |~x|-ary symbol R with RM
′
= Rel(X). By hypothesis,
M ′ |=R~x φ, and furthermore since R
M ′ is in L already the least general model
over M ′ is (M ′,L) for the same L.
Now (M ′,L) |=X φ, and therefore, as R occurs nowhere in φ, (M,L) |=X φ
too. This holds for all X with domains ~x; therefore by the Locality Theorem
(Theorem 3.5), the same holds for all domains containing ~x, and hence LTS |= φ.
This implies that ENS |= φ, as required.

In the next section, we will develop a sound and complete proof system for
this notion of validity with respect to a team definition.
5Without loss of generality, we can assume that the signature of M does not contain the
symbol R.
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5 The proof system
In this section, we will develop a proof system for Independence Logic (with
entailment semantics) and prove its soundness and completeness.
Definition 5.1 (Sequent) Let Γ be a finite first order theory with only param-
eter variables among its free ones, let γ(~x, ~p) be a first order formula and let φ be
an Independence Logic formula with free variables in VT . Then the expression
Γ | γ ⊢ φ
is a sequent.
The intended semantics of a sequent is the following one:
Definition 5.2 (Valid Sequents) Let Γ | γ ⊢ φ be a sequent. Then Γ | γ ⊢ φ
is valid if and only if for all models M and all parameter assignments h with
domain FreeP (Γ) ∪ FreeP (γ) such that M |=h Γ it holds that
M |=γ(h) φ.
The following result is then clear:
Proposition 5.3 For all γ and φ, |=γ φ if and only if ∅ | γ ⊢ φ is valid.
Now, all we need to do is develop some syntactic rules for finding whether a
given sequent is valid.
We can do this as follows:
Definition 5.4 (Axioms and Rules) The axioms of our proof system are
PS-lit If φ is a first order literal with no free parameter variables (that is,
FreeP (φ) = ∅) then
∀~v(γ → φ) | γ ⊢ φ
for all first order formulas γ, where ~v = FreeT (γ) ∪ FreeT (φ);
PS-ind If ~t1, ~t2 and ~t3 are first order terms with no free parameter variables
then
∀~v1~v2((γ(v1) ∧ γ(v2) ∧ ~t1(~v1) = ~t1(~v2))→ ∃~v3(γ(v3) ∧ ~t1~t2(~v3) = ~t1~t2(~v1)∧
~t1~t3(~v3) = ~t1~t3(~v2))) | γ ⊢ ~t2 ⊥~t1
~t3
for all γ, where ~v1 and ~v2 are tuples of variables of the same lengths of
~v = FreeT (γ) ∪ FreeT (~t1~t2~t3), ~ti(~vj) is the tuple obtained by substituting ~v
with ~vj in ~ti, and the same holds for γ(~vj).
The rules of our proof system are
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PS-∨ If Γ1 | γ1 ⊢ φ1 and Γ2 | γ2 ⊢ φ2 then, for all γ, we have
Γ1,Γ2, ∀~v(γ ↔ (γ1 ∨ γ2)) | γ ⊢ φ1 ∨ φ2
where ~v is FreeT (γ) ∪ FreeT (γ1) ∪ FreeT (γ2);
PS-∧ If Γ1 | γ ⊢ φ1 and Γ2 | γ ⊢ φ2 then Γ1,Γ2 | γ ⊢ φ1 ∧ φ2;
PS-∃ If Γ | γ′ ⊢ φ and x is a team variable then, for all γ,
Γ, ∀~v(∃xγ′ ↔ ∃xγ) | γ ⊢ ∃xφ
where ~v = FreeT (γ) ∪ FreeT (γ′);
PS-∀ If Γ | γ′ ⊢ φ and x is a team variable then, for all γ,
Γ, ∀~v(γ′ ↔ ∃xγ) | γ ⊢ ∀xφ
where, as in the previous case, ~v = FreeT (γ) ∪ FreeT (γ
′);
PS-ent If Γ | γ ⊢ φ and
∧
Γ′ |=
∧
Γ holds in First Order Logic then Γ′ | γ ⊢ φ;
PS-depar If Γ | γ ⊢ φ and p is a parameter variable which does not occur free
in γ then ∃p
∧
Γ | γ ⊢ φ;
PS-split If Γ1 | γ ⊢ φ and Γ2 | γ ⊢ φ then (
∧
Γ1) ∨ (
∧
Γ2) | γ ⊢ φ.
Definition 5.5 (Proofs and proof lengths) Let Γ | γ ⊢ φ be a sequent. A
proof of this sequent is a finite list of sequents
(Γ1 | γ1 ⊢ φ1), . . . , (Γn | γn ⊢ φn) = (Γ | γ ⊢ φ)
such that, for all i = 1 . . . n, Γi | γi ⊢ φi is either an instance of PS-lit, PS-ind
or it follows from {Γj | γj ⊢ φj : j < i} through one application of the rules of
our proof system.
Given a proof P = S1 . . . Sn, where each Si is a sequent, we define its length
|P | as n− 1, that is, as the number of sequents in the proof minus one.
Before examining soundness and completeness for this proof system, it will be
useful to obtain a couple of derived rules:
Proposition 5.6 The following rules hold:
PS-FO If φ is a first order formula with no free parameter variables ∀~v(γ →
φ) | γ ⊢ φ is provable for all γ, where ~v = FreeT (γ) ∪ FreeT (φ);
PS-dep If ~t is a tuple of terms, t′ is another term and =(~t, t′) stands for t′ ⊥~t t
′
then
∀~v1~v2(γ(~v1) ∧ γ(~v2) ∧ ~t(~v1) = ~t(~v2))→ t
′(~v1) = t
′(~v2) | γ ⊢=(~t, t
′)
is provable for all γ, where ~v1, ~v2 are tuples of the same length of ~v =
FreeT (γ ∪ FreeT (~tt′).
17
Proof:
PS-FO The proof is by structural induction on φ.
1. If φ is a first order literal, this follows at once from rule PS-lit.
2. If φ is ψ1 ∨ ψ2, by induction hypothesis we have that
∀~v((γ ∧ψ1)→ ψ1) | γ ∧ψ1 ⊢ ψ1 and ∀~v((γ ∧ψ2)→ ψ2) | γ ∧ψ2 ⊢ ψ2
are provable. But then we can prove ∀~v(γ → φ1 ∨ φ2) | γ ⊢ φ as
follows:
(a) ∀~v((γ ∧ ψ1)→ ψ1) | γ ∧ ψ1 ⊢ ψ1 (Derived before)
(b) ∀~v((γ ∧ ψ2)→ ψ2) | γ ∧ ψ2 ⊢ ψ2 (Derived before)
(c) | γ ∧ ψ1 ⊢ ψ1 (PS-ent, from (a), because |= ∀~v((γ ∧ ψ1)→ ψ1)
in First Order Logic)
(d) | γ ∧ ψ2 ⊢ ψ2 (PS-ent, from (b), because |= ∀~v((γ ∧ ψ2)→ ψ2)
in First Order Logic)
(e) ∀~v(γ ↔ (γ ∧ ψ1) ∨ (γ ∧ ψ2)) | γ ⊢ ψ1 ∨ ψ2 (PS-∨, from (c) and
(d))
(f) ∀~v(γ → (ψ1 ∨ ψ2)) | γ ⊢ ψ1 ∨ ψ2 (PS-ent: from (e), because
∀~v(γ → (ψ1 ∨ ψ2)) entails ∀~v(γ ↔ (γ ∧ ψ1) ∨ (γ ∧ ψ2)) in First
Order Logic).
3. If φ is ψ1∧ψ2, by induction hypothesis we have that ∀~v(γ → ψ1) | γ ⊢
ψ1 and ∀~v(γ → ψ2) | γ ⊢ ψ2 are provable. But then
(a) ∀~v(γ → ψ1) | γ ⊢ ψ1 (derived before)
(b) ∀~v(γ → ψ2) | γ ⊢ ψ2 (derived before)
(c) ∀~v(γ → ψ1), ∀~v(γ → ψ2) | γ ⊢ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 (PS-∧, (a), (b))
(d) ∀~v(γ → ψ1 ∧ ψ2) | γ ⊢ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 (PS-ent, (c))
as required.
4. If φ is ∃xψ, by induction hypothesis we have that
∀~v∀x((∃xγ) ∧ ψ)→ ψ) | (∃xγ) ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ is provable. But then
(a) ∀~v∀x(((∃xγ) ∧ ψ)→ ψ) | (∃xγ) ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ (derived before)
(b) | (∃xγ) ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ (PS-ent, from (a))
(c) ∀~v(∃x((∃xγ) ∧ ψ)↔ ∃xγ) | γ ⊢ ∃xψ (PS-∃, from (b))
(d) ∀~v(((∃xγ) ∧ (∃xψ))↔ ∃xγ) | γ ⊢ ∃xψ (PS-ent, from (c))
(e) ∀~v(γ → ∃xψ) | γ ⊢ ψ (PS-ent, from (d))
as required, where the last passage uses the fact that
∀~v(γ → ∃xψ) |= ∀~v(((∃xγ) ∧ (∃xψ))↔ ∃xγ) in First Order Logic.
5. If φ is ∀xψ, by induction hypothesis we have that
∀~v∀x((∃xγ)→ ψ) | ∃xγ ⊢ ψ is provable. But then
(a) ∀~v∀x((∃xγ)→ ψ) | ∃xγ ⊢ ψ (derived before)
(b) ∀~v∀x((∃xγ)→ ψ), ∀~v(∃xγ ↔ ∃xγ) | γ ⊢ ∀xψ (PS-∀, from (a))
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(c) ∀~v∀x((∃xγ)→ ψ) | γ ⊢ ∀xψ (PS-ent, from (c))
(d) ∀~v(γ → ∀xψ) | γ ⊢ ∀xψ (PS-ent, from (d))
where the last two passages hold because ∀~v(∃xγ ↔ ∃xγ) is valid and
because ∀~v(γ → ∀xψ) entails ∀~v∀x((∃xγ) → ψ) in first order logic,
where ~v = FreeT (γ) ∪ FreeT (ψ) (and, therefore, if x is free in γ then
x is in ~v).
PS-dep By definition, =(~t, t′) stands for t′ ⊥~t t
′; therefore, by rule PS-ind we
have that
∀~v1~v2((γ(~v1) ∧ γ(~v2) ∧ ~t(~v1) = ~t(~v2))→
∃~v3(γ(~v3) ∧ ~tt
′(~v3) = ~tt
′(~v1) ∧ ~tt
′(~v3) = ~tt
′(~v2))) | γ ⊢=(~t, t
′).
But the formula
∀~v1~v2((γ(~v1) ∧ γ(~v2) ∧ ~t(~v1) = ~t(~v2))→ t
′(~v1) = t
′(~v2))
entails the premise, and therefore by rule PS-ent we have our conclusion.

Theorem 5.7 (Soundness) Suppose that Γ | γ ⊢ φ is provable. Then it is
valid.
Proof:
If S is a provable sequent then there exists a proof S1 . . . SnS for it. Then we
go by induction of the length n of this proof:
Base case Suppose that the proof has length 0. Then S is an instance of PS-lit
or of PS-ind. Suppose first that it is the former, that is, that
S = ∀~v(γ → φ) | γ ⊢ φ
for some first order γ and some first order literal φ, where
~v = FreeT (γ) ∪ FreeT (φ) and φ has no parameter variables. Now suppose
that M |=h ∀~x(γ → φ); then, by definition, if s is an assignment over
team variables such that M |=h∪s γ then M |=s φ. Therefore, by ES-lit,
M |=γ(s) φ in entailment semantics, as required.
The case corresponding to PS-ind and ES-ind is entirely similar.
Induction case Let S1S2 . . . SnS be our proof. For each i ≤ n we have that
S1 . . . Si is a valid proof for Si, and hence by induction hypothesis that Si
is valid. Now let us consider which rule r was been used to derive S from
S1 . . . Sn:
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1. If r was PS-lit or PS-ind then (S) is a proof for S already, and
hence by our base case S is valid;
2. If r was PS-∨ then S is Γ1,Γ2, ∀~v(γ ↔ (γ1 ∨ γ2)) | γ ⊢ φ1 ∨ φ2,
and there exist two i, j ≤ n such that Si = (Γ1 | γ1 ⊢ φ1) and
Sj = (Γ2 | γ2 ⊢ φ2). By induction hypothesis, these sequents are
valid.
Now suppose that M |=h Γ1,Γ2, ∀~v(γ ↔ (γ1 ∨ γ2)). Then, since
M |=h Γ1, we have that M |=γ1(h) φ1, and, analogously, since M |=h
Γ2 we have that M |=γ2(h) φ2. Furthermore, M |=h ∀~v(γ ↔ γ1 ∨ γ2),
and therefore by rule ES-∨ we have that M |=γ φ1 ∨φ2, as required.
3. If r was PS-∧ then Sn is of the form Γ1,Γ2 | γ ⊢ φ1 ∧ φ2 and, by
induction hypothesis, Γ1 | γ ⊢ φ1 and Γ2 | γ ⊢ φ2 are valid. Now
suppose that M |=h Γ1,Γ2; then M |=γ(h) φ1 and M |=γ(h) φ2, and
therefore M |=γ(h) φ1 ∧ φ2 by ES-∧.
4. If r was PS-∃ then Sn is of the form Γ, ∀~v(∃xγ′ ↔ ∃xγ) | γ ⊢ ∃xφ,
where Γ | γ′ ⊢ φ is valid by induction hypothesis. Now suppose that
M |=h Γ, ∀~v(∃xγ ↔ ∃xγ′); then M |=γ′(h) φ and M |=h ∀~v(∃xγ ↔
∃xγ′), and therefore M |=γ(h) ∃xφ by rule ES-∃.
5. If r was PS-∀ then Sn is of the form Γ, ∀~v(γ′ ↔ ∃xγ) | γ ⊢ ∀xφ,
where Γ | γ′ ⊢ φ is valid by induction hypothesis. Now, suppose
that M |=h Γ, ∀~v(γ′ ↔ ∃xγ). Then M |=γ′(h) φ, and furthermore
M |=h ∀~v(γ′ ↔ ∃xγ). Therefore, by rule ES-∀, M |=γ(h) ∀xφ, as
required.
6. If r was PS-ent then Sn is of the form Γ
′ | γ ⊢ φ, where Γ | γ ⊢ φ
is valid by induction hypothesis and where
∧
Γ |=
∧
Γ′ holds in first
order logic. Now suppose that M |=h Γ′; then M |=h Γ, and hence
M |=γ(h) φ, as required.
7. If r wasPS-depar then Sn is of the form ∃p
∧
Γ | γ ⊢ φ, where Γ | γ ⊢
φ holds by induction hypothesis and where the parameter variable
p does not occur free in γ. Now suppose that M |=h ∃p
∧
Γ; then
there exists an element m ∈ Dom(M) such that, for h′ = h[m/p],
M |=h′ Γ. Then M |=γ(h′) φ; but as p does not occur free in γ we
then have, by Proposition 4.4, that M |=γ(h) φ as required.
8. If r was PS-split then Sn is of the form (
∧
Γ1) ∨ (
∧
Γ2) | γ ⊢ φ,
where Γ1 | γ ⊢ φ and Γ2 | γ ⊢ φ by induction hypothesis. Now
suppose that M |=h (
∧
Γ1) ∨ (
∧
Γ2). Then M |=h Γ1 or M |=h Γ2;
and in either case, M |=γ(h) φ, as required.

In order to prove completeness, we first need a lemma:
Lemma 5.8 Suppose that M |=γ(h) φ. Then there exists a finite Γ such that
Γ | γ ⊢ φ is provable and such that M |=h Γ.
20
Proof:
The proof is by structural induction on φ.
1. If φ is a first order literal or an independence atom, this follows imme-
diately from a comparison of ES-lit and PS-lit, and of ES-ind and
PS-ind.
2. If φ is ψ1 ∨ ψ2 and M |=γ(h) φ then, by definition, there exists an as-
signment h′ extending h and two first order formulas γ1, γ2 such that
M |=γ1(h′) ψ1, M |=γ2(h′) ψ2 and M |=h′ ∀~v(γ ↔ γ1 ∨ γ2). Let ~p be the
tuple of parameters in Dom(h′)\Dom(h); now, by induction hypothesis we
have that there exist Γ1 and Γ2 such that Γ1 | γ1 ⊢ ψ1 and Γ2 | γ2 ⊢ ψ2
are provable, and such that furthermore M |=h′ Γ1 and M |=h′ Γ2.
But then the following is a correct proof:
(a) Γ1 | γ1 ⊢ ψ1 (Derived before)
(b) Γ2 | γ2 ⊢ ψ2 (Derived before)
(c) Γ1,Γ2, ∀~v(γ ↔ γ1 ∨ γ2) | γ ⊢ φ (PS-∨, (a), (b))
(d) ∃~p(
∧
Γ1 ∧
∧
Γ2 ∧ ∀~v(γ ↔ γ1 ∨ γ2)) | γ ⊢ φ (PS-depar, (c))
6
Finally, M |=h ∃~p(
∧
Γ1 ∧
∧
Γ2 ∧ ∀~v(γ ↔ γ1 ∨ γ2)), as required, because
there exists a tuple of elements ~m such that h[~m/~p] = h′.
3. If φ is ψ1 ∧ ψ2 and M |=γ(h) φ, then M |=γ(h) ψ1 and M |=γ(h) ψ2. Then,
by induction hypothesis, there exist Γ1 and Γ2 such that Γ1 | γ ⊢ ψ1 and
Γ2 | γ ⊢ ψ2 are provable and such that M |=h Γ1Γ2. Then by rule PS-∧,
Γ1Γ2 | γ ⊢ ψ1 ∧ ψ2, as required.
4. If φ is ∃xψ and M |=γ(h) φ, then there exists a tuple ~p of parameter
variables not in the domain of h, a tuple ~m of elements of the model and a
formula γ′ such that, for h′ = h[~m/~p],M |=γ′(h′) ψ andM |=h′ ∀~v(∃xγ
′ ↔
∃xγ). By induction hypothesis, we then have a Γ′ such that Γ′ | γ′ ⊢ ψ
and M |=h′ Γ′.
Then the following is a valid proof:
(a) Γ′ | γ′ ⊢ ψ (Derived before)
(b) Γ′, ∀~v(∃xγ′ ↔ ∃xγ) | γ ⊢ ∃xψ (PS-∃)
(c) ∃~p(
∧
Γ′ ∧ ∀~v(∃xγ′ ↔ ∃xγ)) | γ ⊢ ∃xψ (PS-depar)
Furthermore, M |=h ∃~p(
∧
Γ′ ∧ ∀~v(∃xγ′ ↔ ∃xγ)), as required.
5. If φ is ∀xψ and M |=γ(h) φ, then there exists a tuple ~p of parameter
variables not in the domain of h, a tuple ~m of elements of the model and
a formula γ′ such that M |=γ′(h′) ψ and M |=h′ ∀~v(γ
′ ↔ ∃xγ), where
6To be entirely formal, this passage consists of |~p| distinct applications of PS-depar, all
of which are correct because none of the parameters in ~p appear in γ.
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h′ = h[~m/~p]. By induction hypothesis, we can then find a Γ′ such that
Γ′ | γ′ ⊢ ψ is provable and M |=h′ Γ′.
Then the following is a valid proof:
(a) Γ′ | γ′ ⊢ ψ (Derived before)
(b) Γ′, ∀~v(γ′ ↔ ∃xγ) | γ ⊢ ∀xψ (PS-∀)
(c) ∃~p(
∧
Γ′ ∧ ∀~v(γ′ ↔ ∃xγ)) | γ ⊢ ∀xψ (PS-depar)
And, once again, the assignment h satisfies the antecedent of the last
sequent, as required.

The completeness of our proof system follows from the above lemma and from
the compactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem for First Order Logic:
Theorem 5.9 (Completeness) Suppose that Γ | γ ⊢ φ is valid, where Γ is
finite. Then it is provable.
Proof:
Since Γ | γ ⊢ φ is valid, for any first order model M over the signature of Γ,
γ and φ and for all h such that M |=h Γ we have that M |=γ(h) φ, and hence
by the lemma that M |=h ΓM,h for some finite ΓM,h such that ΓM,h | γ ⊢ φ is
provable.
Then consider the first order, countable7 theory
T = {
∧
Γ} ∪ {¬
∧
ΓM,h :M is a countable model,
h is an assignment s.t. M |=h Γ}.
This theory is unsatisfiable. Indeed, suppose that M0 is a model that satisfies∧
Γ under the assignment h0: then, by the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem, there
exists a countable elementary submodel (M ′0, h
′
0) of (M0, h0).
Now, M ′0 |=h′0 Γ and M
′
0 is countable, and hence by definition M
′
0 |=h′0
ΓM ′
0
,h′
0
.
But then M0 |=h0 ΓM ′0,h′0 too, and therefore M0 is not a model of T .
By the compactness theorem, this implies that there exists a finite subset
T0 = {¬
∧
ΓM1,h1 , . . . ,¬
∧
ΓMn,hn} of T such that {
∧
Γ} ∪ T0 is unsatisfiable,
that is, such that
Γ |= (
∧
ΓM1,h1) ∨ . . . ∨ (
∧
ΓMn,hn).
Now, for each i, ΓMi,hi | γ ⊢ φ can be proved. Therefore, by rule PS-split,
we have that (
∧
ΓM1,s1) ∨ . . . ∨ (
∧
ΓMn,sn) | γ ⊢ φ is also provable; and finally,
7The fact that it is countable follows at once from the fact that it is a first order theory
over a countable vocabulary.
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by rule PS-ent we can prove that Γ | γ ⊢ φ, as required.

Using essentially the same method, it is also possible to prove a “compactness”
result for our semantics:
Theorem 5.10 Suppose that Γ | γ ⊢ φ is valid. Then there exists a finite
Γ0 ⊆ Γ such that Γ0 | γ ⊢ φ is provable (and valid).
Proof:
Let κ = max(|Γ|,ℵ0), and consider the theory
T = Γ ∪ {¬
∧
ΓM,h : |M | ≤ κ,M |=h Γ}
where, as in the previous proof, ΓM,h is a finite theory such that M |=h ΓM,h
and such that ΓM,h | γ ⊢ φ is provable in our system.
Then T is unsatisfiable: indeed, if T had a model then it would have a model
(M,h) of cardinality at most κ, and since that model would satisfy Γ it would
satisfy ΓM,h too, which contradicts our hypothesis.
Hence, by the compactness theorem, there exists a finite set
{
∧
ΓM1,h1 , . . . ,
∧
ΓMn,hn} and a finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ such that
Γ0 |=
∧
ΓM1,h1 ∨ . . . ∨
∧
ΓMn,hn .
But by rule PS-split, we have that
∧
ΓM1,h1∨. . .∨
∧
ΓMn,hn | γ ⊢ φ is provable,
and hence by rule PS-ent Γ0 | γ ⊢ φ is also provable, as required.

6 Adding more teams
The proof system that we developed in the previous section is, as we saw, sound
and complete with respect to its intended semantics. However, this semantics
is perhaps quite weak: all that we know is that the teams which correspond to
parametrized first order formulas belong in our general models.
Rather than adding more and more axioms to our proof system in order
to guarantee the existence of more teams, in this section we will attempt to
separate our assumptions about team existence from our main proof system.
This will allow us to modulate our formalism: depending on our needs, we may
want to assume the existence of more or of less teams in our general model.
The natural language for describing assertions about the existence of rela-
tions is of course, existential second order logic. The following definitions show
how it can be used for our purposes:
Definition 6.1 (Relation Existence Theory) A relation existence theory Θ
is a set of existential second order sentences of the form ∃~Rφ(~R), where φ is
first order.
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Definition 6.2 (Θ-closed general models) Let (M,G) be a general model,
and let Θ be a relation existence theory. Then (M,G) is Θ-closed if and only
if for all ∃~Rφ(~R) in Θ there exists a tuple of teams ~X ∈ G such that M |=
φ[ ~Rel( ~X)/ ~R].
Definition 6.3 (Θ-valid sequents) Let Γ | γ ⊢ φ be a sequent and let Θ be a
relation existence theory. Then Γ|γ ⊢ φ is valid if and only if for all Θ-closed
models (M.G) and all parameter assignments h with domain FreeP (Γ)∪FreeP (γ)
such that M |=h Γ it holds that
(M,G) |=‖γ‖h φ.
Our proof system for Θ-closed general models can then be obtained by adding
the following rule to our system:
PS-Θ If Γ1(~S),Γ2 | γ ⊢ φ is provable, where the relation symbols ~S do not occur
in Γ2, in γ or in φ, and ∃~R
∧
Γ1(~R) is in Θ for some ~R then Γ2 | γ ⊢ φ is
provable.
Theorem 6.4 (Soundness) Let Γ | γ ⊢ φ be a sequent which is provable in
our proof system plus PS-Θ. Then it is Θ-valid.
Proof:
The proof is by induction on the length of the proof, and follows very closely the
one given already. Hence, we only examine the case in which the last rule used in
the proof is PS-Θ. Then, by induction hypothesis, we have that Γ1(~S),Γ | γ ⊢ φ
is Θ-valid for some Γ1 and some ~S which does not occur in Γ, in γ or in φ, and
moreover ∃~R
∧
Γ1(~R) is in Θ.
Now, let (M,G) be any Θ-closed general model, and let us assume without
loss of generality that the relation symbols in ~S are not part of its signature.
Furthermore, let h be a parameter assignment (with domain Free(Γ)∪Free(γ))
such that M |=h Γ. By definition, there exists a tuple of teams ~X ∈ G such
that M |=
∧
Γ1[ ~Rel( ~X)/~S]. Now let M
′ be M [ ~Rel( ~X)/~S]: since ~X is in G, it
is not difficult to see that (M ′,G) is a general model. Furthermore, it is Θ-
closed, M ′ |= Γ1, and M ′ |=h Γ. Hence, (M ′,G) |=‖γ‖h φ; but since the relation
symbols ~S do not occur in γ or in φ, this implies that (M,G) |=‖γ‖h φ.

In order to prove completeness, we first need a definition and a simple lemma.
Definition 6.5 (ΘFO) Let Θ be a relation existence theory. Then ΘFO is the
theory {θi[~Si/ ~R] : ∃~Rθi(~R) ∈ Θ}, where the tuples of symbols ~Si are all disjoint
and otherwise unused.
Lemma 6.6 Let Θ be a relation existence theory and let M be a model such
that M |= ΘFO. Then the least general model over it (M,L) is Θ-closed.
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Proof:
Consider any ∃~Rθ(~R) ∈ Θ. ThenM |= θ(~Si), for some tuple of relation symbols
~Si in the signature of M . Then, the teams ~X associated to the corresponding
relations are in L, and for these teams we have that M |= θ[ ~Rel( ~X)/ ~R], as
required.

Theorem 6.7 (Completeness) Suppose that Γ | γ ⊢ φ is Θ-valid. Then it is
provable in our proof system plus PS-Θ.
Proof:
Let M be any first order model satisfying ΘFO, where we assume that the
relation symbols used in the construction of ΘFO do not occur in Γ, in γ or
in φ. Then, by the lemma, (M,L) is Θ-closed, and this implies that, for all
assignments h such that M |=h Γ, M |=‖γ‖h φ.
Therefore, ΘFO,Γ | γ ⊢ φ is valid; and hence, for some finite ∆ ⊆ ΘFO it
holds that ∆,Γ | γ ⊢ φ is provable. Now we can get rid of ∆ through repeated
applications of rule PS-Θ and, therefore, prove that Γ | γ ⊢ φ, as required.

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